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Effects of Expectancy on Assessing Covariation in
Data: “Prior Belief” versus “Meaning”
Dorrit Billman
Georgia Institute of Technology

and

Brian Bornstein and Jeffrey Richards
University of Pennsylvania
A large number of researchers have addressed the question of how prior beliefs
affect assessment of covariation in new data. Some have suggested that prior
beliefs disrupt covariation assessment (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), while others
have claimed they help (Wright & Murphy, 1984). Research in this tradition
has not consistently distinguished meaningfulness of the data from expectations
about the particular relationship between the variables to be assessed. We
collected covariance judgments on meaningful variable pairs where subjects
had a prior belief in a positive relation, had a prior belief in a negative relation,
had a prior belief that the variables are unrelated, or were agnostic about the
existence or nature of relation. Subjects rated data with negative, positive, and
zero correlations. We evaluated performance in terms of subjects’ ability to
discriminate objectively different correlations, rather than simply comparing to
a reference statistic, and also on the bias subjects showed. Subjects with no prior
belief, with positive beliefs, and with negative beliefs were all reasonably well
able to discriminate among different objective correlations. In addition, subjects
with no prior belief showed appropriate use of the judgment scale, while those
having a positive or negative expectation were biased in the direction of their
prior belief. In contrast, subjects with the prior belief that the variables were
unrelated showed essentially no discrimination. Our results disconfirm the
hypothesis that prior beliefs generally facilitate correlation assessment of
summarized data. Judgments of meaningful data were best when subjects were
initially agnostic.

INTRODUCTION
Assessing contingency is a fundamental aspect of learning from experience
and has been widely investigated for its importance in both informal and
The research was supported by NIMH Grant R23H220522 to Dorrit Billman and was conducted
during Brian Bornstein’s tenure as a NSF predoctoral fellow. We thank Jon Baron and Saul
Sternberg for comments on the research. Address correspondence and reprint requests to Dorrit
Billman, School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332.
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scientific reasoning (cf. Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984, and Crocker, 1981, for
reviews). Some researchers have stressed how poorly people assess actual
contingency and how much they are overwhelmed by prior belief; the
identical objective correlation is judged very differently if it conflicts versus
is consistent with existing beliefs. Effects of self-fulfilling prophecies (Snyder
& Swann, 1978), confirmation bias in evidence selection (Trope & Hassock,
1982; Skov & Sherman, 1986), selective encoding of evidence to match
prior beliefs (Cohen, 1981; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), and overweighing
priors in belief revision all focus on the problems stemming from overuse of
prior beliefs. Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969) in their work on illusory
correlation stressed how heavily people relied on prior beliefs which made
them insensitive to actual patterns in the data. Jennings, Amabile, and Ross
(1982) emphasized how poor people were at assessing contingency, whether
the data were meaningful (pictured heights of men and walking sticks) or
abstract (unlabeled pairs of numbers). Comparing performance across studies,
Alloy and Tabachnik (1984) suggested that sensitivity to objective correlations
is only good when relevant prior beliefs are absent or when the expected and
actual relation are congruent.
The fact that people are affected by background knowledge, however , does
not mean that performance is worse when background beliefs are available.
Only a few researchers have compared performance on covariation assessment
tasks with abstract versus meaningful variables while equating other aspects
of the task. Miller (1971) and Muchinsky and Dudycha (1974) looked at how
accurately subjects’ predictions reflected objective correlation. Wright and
Murphy (1984) looked at direct estimation of correlation from summarized
data. These studies found that people do worse on the abstract variables, though
this is where prior belief should least disrupt performance.
It is possible that simply the meaningfulness of the data, aside from
particular beliefs about them, is the primary factor affecting performance. In
general, more meaningful material can be held in short-term memory and it
is easier to encode and retrieve from long-term memory. Since remembering
and comparing data across the data set is needed for contingency assessment
(even when all the data is simultaneously present), this might be the primary or
sufficient mechanism to explain performance differences with abstract versus
meaningful data. If this were the case, the nature of the prior beliefs would
not affect the process of assessment. On the other hand, something about the
particular content of the prior beliefs does influence the resulting contingency
judgment; where prior beliefs are for a positive correlation, judgments are
biased positively, and where negative, negatively. While we know background
knowledge affects contingency assessment, we know little about the manner in
which different sorts of background beliefs affect assessment or the mechanisms
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for the effects. Given that abstract variables are more difficult to assess than
meaningful ones, the current research investigates how different types of
prior beliefs about meaningful variables affect the process and outcome of
contingency assessment.
The research reported here addresses three goals. First, we assess how
the particular type of prior belief affects contingency assessment. Second, we
consider what is meant by “good” or “bad” assessment and what measures will
be most informative. Finally, we layout some alternatives in how processing
may change with different prior beliefs and map these onto expected patterns
of performance.
Meaningfulness and Types of Prior Belief
We distinguish between meaningfulness of individual variables and prior
belief about how the variables are related. While one cannot have a prior
belief unless the variables have an established meaning, there are variable
pairs which are individually meaningful but for which one has no opinion on
whether or how they are related. These two factors have not been distinguished
in previous work; subjects probably did have some prior beliefs about how
meaningful variables were related but these were not assessed.
Our experiment used meaningful variables which differed in the type of
prior belief. We compared four belief conditions: Positive (Correlation) Belief,
Negative (Correlation) Belief, Belief in Zero Correlation, and Don’t Know. The
first three conditions use pairs of meaningful variables about which subjects
have a specific expectation about the nature of the relationship (or its absence);
in the latter condition the variables are independently meaningful but subjects
were agnostic about whether or how they might be related.
Assessing Effects of Prior Belief
We assume that the primary value of detecting contingency is telling
that some things are more related than others. This requires discriminating
objectively different correlations and encoding this information to allow
comparison and communication. Typically subjects’ correlation judgments are
correlated with or compared to a reference statistic, be it Pearson’s correlation,
percentage variance, or some other metric. This approach assumes that the
particular scale is psychologically real and should be the standard for estimation
and it combines underlying discrimination with how the rating scale is used.
In contrast, we assume only that the direction of the scale and the reference
point of no relation are meaningful. Rather than comparing to a reference
statistic, we look for rating differences for different objective contingencies
and prior beliefs. By looking for changes in the pattern of subjects’ ratings we
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can still evaluate subjects’ estimation. In particular we can assess how well
subjects discriminate objectively different correlations and whether or how
this is affected by prior belief.
We need to contrast discrimination, sensitivity, and bias. Good discrimination
depends on having reasonably good sensitivity and bias. As in signal detection
theory (Green & Swets, 1966) sensitivity refers to underlying ability to
distinguish between objectively different stimuli and bias refers to boundaries
the subjects sets in using the response categories or points on a rating scale.
Prior work, comparing judgments to a reference statistic, focused on how
strongly subjects are biased by prior belief. We are particularly interested in
whether prior belief affects discrimination. Poor sensitivity always leads to
poor discrimination, but poor bias can as well. For example, subjects might
have such a strong positive bias that all judgments would be compressed to
the “most positive” end of a rating scale and underlying sensitivity could not
be expressed.
In sum, several changes follow from focusing on differences across belief
conditions rather than comparison to a reference statistic. First, we are primarily
interested in discrimination: Is eating vitamin C or getting lots of sleep more
related to preventing colds? How does prior belief affect such comparisons?
While we are interested in differences in bias, we are most interested in their
possible effects on discrimination. Second, we are interested in identifying
where poor discrimination might be due to lack of sensitivity and where to bad
bias. In turn, this helps pin down where in the evaluation process prior belief has
its effect(s): relatively late in the process, such as deciding how to use the rating
scale, or earlier, such as making subjects oblivious to data in the first place.
Effects of Prior Belief on Processing
Prior research strongly suggests that prior beliefs will have a biasing effect
on assessment of new data. When asked to assess a data set, people seem to
have a hard time separating what they believe generally is true in the world
from assessing one particular data set, even when the contrast is made very
explicit (Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988). We consider three, alternative
effects prior belief might have beyond a simple bias.
One possibility is that while meaningful data can be assessed more effectively
than abstract data, the particular sort of prior belief about the variables does
not change the assessment process. Given meaningful data, a subject will not
differentially tune out, compare, or evaluate data, from one type of belief to
another. Subjects would show equal ability to distinguish between objectively
different correlations in all conditions, once subjects were assessing meaningful
data. The “Don’t Know” condition would differ in the absence of bias, but
would be otherwise the same. Indeed, discrimination might be uniformly good
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across different prior beliefs, but prior work, focusing on the match to some
particular measure of correlation, might not have identified this.
Another possibility is that availability of any hypothesis helps in the
evaluation of data (Wright & Murphy, 1984), above and beyond any effects of
meaningfulness of the individual variables. Just as the additional structure from
meaningful variables leads to improved performance, the additional structure
from a prior belief, be it in positive, zero, or no relation, might further help in
the assessment process. So, while a prior belief might bias the final estimate,
it might also help the subject encode or compare data. The value of having
a hypothesis has been suggested by others for organizing what data to look
for (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder; 1974). While this differs from covariation
assessment tasks, both require integrating evidence across cases. Having a
hypothesis might benefit tallying consistent versus inconsistent cases, looking
for exceptions, or guiding encoding. If this is correct, the Positive, Negative,
and Belief in Zero Conditions would show similar, good, discrimination, while
the “Don’t Know” condition would show least discrimination, though also
least bias.
Finally, the particular prior belief might affect assessment in a very specific
way, such that the important contrast might be between believing variables are
totally irrelevant versus believing they are or might be related. This contrast
may be the most fundamental of all. Related variables usually come from the
same domain; variables we strongly believe could not be related usually come
from different domains. With variables in different domains, we typically lack
theoretical or causal links; hence, forming explanations of correlations across
domains may require appeals to causal principles we do not trust or believe in,
such as ESP, divine intervention, or conspiracy theories. Belief in no relation
seems to entail the greatest change should we be proved wrong and usually we
only consider whether variables are negatively or positively related if we have
some reason to think them mutually relevant. Hence subjects might be least
affected by the data and least able to discriminate differences in the belief in
Zero Condition and do roughly the same in the three conditions where subjects
believe the variables are or might be related.
THE EXPERIMENT
A pilot study using a mixed within and between-subjects design found
that prior belief interacted with data type: when subjects were in the Positive,
Negative, or Don’t Know Conditions, they discriminated among the data sets,
but when subjects believed the variables were unrelated they could not. The
present study used a completely within-subject design. In addition to a rating
task, it included a forced choice task to provide another tool for separating the
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effects of bias versus sensitivity. Subjects’ sensitivity, not just discrimination,
was assessed by having them pick which of two data sets had the stronger
correlation. Since no rating scale was used, bias could not affect judgment.
Method
Materials
Variable pairs. We compared performance in four belief conditions: Positive
(Correlation) Belief, Negative (Correlation) Belief, Belief in Zero Correlation,
and Don’t Know. We piloted to find variables where subjects shared the same
expectation. Variable pairs were selected so that while the intended relation was
generally believed, it was far from logically required. We wanted our subjects
to be able to imagine how alternative data (with which they were presented)
might be produced. Variables in the Don’t Know condition were individually
meaningful but subjects did not have a specific correlational belief connecting
them. Subjects were instructed to respond “don’t know” if they “suspect{ed}
that there might be some sort of relationship, but {were} sure neither about the
existence of such a relationship nor about its possible direction.” For Belief
in Zero variable pairs, subjects reported a prior belief that the variables were
specifically unrelated and independent.
Piloting identified 12 variable pairs for which there was good agreement
about the relationship between the variables: two each in the Positive and
Negative Belief conditions, and four each in the Don’t Know (which showed
the least consensus) and Belief in Zero conditions (see Table 1). More pairs were
included for the latter two conditions because we were especially interested in
a comparison between these conditions.
Data sets. Three types of data sets—positive, negative, and zero correlation—
were constructed for subjects to judge. Each data set consisted of 15 observations
for each of two variables, with the observations paired to generate the desired
correlation. Each set was generated independently to ensure that results were
not an artifact of one particular data sample. For each pair of variables, a data
set of each type was generated: Zero: Pearson’s r = 0.0 (±.07); Positive: r = +.5
(±.03); and Negative: r = –.5 (±.03). Standard normal distributions for each
set were produced with a random number generator, and the values linearly
transformed to the mean and standard deviation appropriate for the variables.1
1 Due to our relatively small sample size, any two sets of variable values might not
be exactly independent and have the target correlation, The solution was to generate many
sample distributions and pick those pairs between which the required correlation and
independence held. These distributions were then linearly transformed to meet the sample
mean and standard deviation requirements of a given variable, and occasionally slightly
modified to repair round-off error.
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each variable pair to be assessed. A cover story appeared at the top of each
page, followed by two data sets labeled Group A and Group B, each with 15
observations on both variables.
For each variable pair, one data set had a zero correlation and the other
either a +.5 or a –.5 correlation. Across subjects, eight different orderings of
the variable pairs were used. On half their judgments (Rating), subjects rated
each of the two data sets separately; on the other half (Forced Choice), subjects
made forced choice judgments, picking which of the two data sets showed a
stronger correlation. Each subject saw (1) half the pages with –.5/0 and half
with +.5/0 pairs of data sets, (2) half with the zero data set on top and half on
the bottom, and (3) half forced choice and half rating judgments. Each variable
pair was presented in all eight combinations, creating eight Randomized Sets
with 12 items in each set. Order of variable pairs was randomized differently
in each Randomized Set. The answer book had six pages for rating judgments
and six for forced choice responses. There were two Task Orders of each
Randomized Set, one with the block of Forced Choice judgments presented
first and the other with the Rating judgments presented first.
Design
The balanced design used two experimental factors, Belief (Positive,
Negative, Belief in Zero, Don’t Know) and Data (Positive, Negative, Zero),
and three counterbalancing factors, Randomized Set, Task Order, and Item.
Subjects
Subjects were 48 undergraduate students from a University of Pennsylvania
paid subject pool. The majority of subjects in this pool have had no statistics;
some have had an introductory course. They received $3 each for their halfhour participation.

In all, 72 sets of observations were independently generated: (12 Variable Pairs)
* (2 Variables in the Pair) * (3 Correlation Sets per Variable Pair).
Cover stories. Cover stories for each of the variable pairs described the
data as generated by a scientific study which gathered information about both
variables. “Subjects” in the invented studies were given names to increase the
data’s meaningfulness. Subjects who were questioned informally about the
data’s credibility after the experiment believed the stories to be authentic.
Stimulus booklets. Each story booklet consisted of instructions, a rating
sheet for prior belief about each variable pair, and a page with data for

Procedure
Subjects participated individually. The experimenter explained the general
nature of the task and gave out a story booklet with instructions and an answer
booklet. The instructions gave an overview of the task, explained and gave
examples of the different types of relationship that might exist between a pair
of variables (strong or weak; positive, negative, unrelated, or “don’t know”)
and told subjects they would be judging sets of new data.
First subjects indicated their current belief about the relation between the
variables, then they judged the data sets. For each of the 12 variable pairs
subjects read the cover story, studied the two data sets, and indicated their
judgment in the answer booklet. For half the variable pairs subjects rated
each data set individually; for half they decided which had a stronger relation.
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Forced Choice and Rating judgments were blocked for each subject and
analyzed separately. In the rating judgments, the subject indicated the strength
of relationship in the data by marking his or her estimate on a scale of 0 to
100, where 0 meant “not related” and 100 meant “strongest possible relation.”
Subjects then indicated for each data set whether the relationship was positive
or negative (unless they chose 0 on the scale). We used this measure because
we thought subjects might find strength of relation easy to judge but might not
operate well in distinguishing positive from negative relations; were this so,
judgments of size of relation might be a more sensitive index. In the forced
choice task, the subject picked the data set (Group A or Group B) that showed
the stronger relationship and then indicated whether the relationship in the
Group was positive or negative. The two tasks are difficult in different ways:
the rating task requires assigning a number, which the forced choice does
not, but the forced choice requires considering and comparing two data sets
together. Finally, subjects were debriefed, and the fabricated nature of the data
and the purpose of the experiment were discussed.
Results
Response Classification
Overall, subjects’ initial beliefs about the relation between two variables
differed from the intended belief on 31% of the judgments. Subjects were
especially reluctant to report lack of an opinion (59% disagreed with our
“Don’t Know variable pairs). To avoid dropping such a large part of the critical
data, we used subjects’ reported beliefs to redefine the Belief condition for
these judgments.
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beliefs and more negatively with negative prior beliefs, relative to judgments in
the Don’t Know and Belief in Zero conditions. Post hoc analyses showed that
the Positive, Negative, and Belief in Zero belief conditions all differed from
each other but that the Don’t Know condition differed only from the Positive
condition (Tukey’s HSD, p < .05). Thus, there was a general biasing effect
of Prior Belief, such that the specific nature of the belief—whether positive,
negative, or zero—shifted subjects’ evaluations of the data in the corresponding
direction. Subjects’ judgments were also appropriately influenced by the relation

Main Effects of Belief and Data on Relatedness Ratings
The primary analysis was a repeated-measure ANOVA of rated relatedness
with Belief, Data, and Subjects as factors. We combined the magnitude of
the relatedness estimate with whether it was negative or positive to get the
rated relationship. (We did comparable analyses of absolute value of the rated
relationship, but subjects were always less sensitive. Thus, we used the real
rather than absolute value.) Randomized Set, Task Order, and Item within
belief were assessed separately; only Item was significant [Item F(41, 506)
= 2.43, p < .0001]; including Item in the main ANOVA did not change any
effects.
Mean ratings by Belief and Data are shown in Table 2 and Fig. 1. The main
effects of Belief [F(3, 497) = 16.90; p < .0001] and Data [F(2, 497) = 45.42; p
< .0001] were both significant. (Reduced df come from reclassification to use
subjects’ own beliefs.) Subjects judged data more positively with positive prior

Fig. 1. Judgments of relatedness from Experiment 1. Judged relation for positive (+.5),
zero, and negative (–.5) correlations in the presented data sets, grouped by prior belief
about the variable pairs presented.
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objectively present in the data set. All levels of Data differed significantly from
one another (Tukey’s HSD p < .05).
Interaction Effects of Belief and Data on Relatedness Ratings
The Belief × Data interaction is our primary measure of differential use of
the data in different conditions. The interaction was significant , [F(6, 497) =
3.44; p < .003] and shows clearly in Fig. 1. The Positive, Negative, and Don’t
Know belief conditions all showed substantial differences in ratings of the
positive and negative data, differences of 34 to 47 points. In contrast, ratings in
the Belief in Zero condition differed only 14 points for positive and negative
data. As in the pilot experiment, these means suggest that discrimination varies
across belief conditions, with subjects in the Belief in Zero condition least able
to discriminate between different objective correlations.
We explored the nature of this interaction by one-way ANOVAs run
separately within each belief condition. The ANOVAs for all four beliefconditions were significant (all F’s > 5.0; p’s < .005). Thus, subjects in the Belief
in Zero condition did show significant discrimination of the data, although the
magnitude of the effect is less than in the other conditions (14 vs 34–47 points.).
Further, subjects in the Belief in Zero condition showed the least variation in
their ratings. Standard deviations across data types ranged from 16.5 to 25.6 for
the Belief in Zero condition, as opposed to 24.5 to 36.0 in the other conditions.
The existence of an interaction, as well as the difference in variances, suggests
that a Belief in Zero correlation exerts a stronger bias than other types (or an
absence) or prior belief. It forcefully compresses all ratings toward zero, thereby
impairing discrimination between different data sets.
Effects of Belief on Forced Choice Judgments
The forced choice procedure was included to avoid the effects of bias in using
a rating scale. Differences among conditions in performance on this measure
could not be due to different biases in using the response scale and must be truly
due to differential sensitivity. Performance overall was modest, with 60% correct
and chance performance equal to 50%. However, performance is best in the Belief
in Zero condition with 73% correct, compared to 53% for Positive and Negative
belief combined, and 57% for Don’t Know. These differences in percentage
correct are significant [χ2 = 8.09; p < .02], and only the 73% score is above chance
[binomial probability <.0001]. These results suggest that if the task is to compare
data sets directly, the Belief in Zero condition is not at all disadvantaged. The
fact that subjects in this condition perform at least as well as subjects in the other
Belief conditions suggests that a major part of their poor discrimination on the
rating task is the result of bias and not a lack of underlying sensitivity.
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This finding was confirmed by rescoring the rating data as forced choice
to compare performance in the forced choice and rating tasks. Equal ratings,
of which there were many in the Belief in Zero condition, were treated as
guesses and scored half correct and half as errors. By this scoring, the Positive
and Negative Belief conditions together had 65% correct, the Don’t Know
condition 60%, and the Belief in Zero condition 59%. Thus, when effects
of bias were removed by this rescoring or by the true Forced Choice task,
the Belief in Zero Condition did not show a disadvantage. Any differential
performance appears to be caused by an especially strong bias when making
quantitative judgments, and not by diminished sensitivity.
DISCUSSION
Effects of Belief on Performance
Our subjects’ primary task was rating strength of relation between two
meaningful variables. From a normative perspective, performance was best
in the Don’t Know condition. Here subjects showed good discrimination
among objectively different correlations. They also showed no evidence of
bias: the zero point of the rating scale was used for variable pairs with no
relation while positive and negative judgments were symmetrical around this
zero point. In comparison, judgments with positive or negative prior beliefs
showed comparable discrimination but biased use of the scale. Finally, when
subjects believed that two variables were unrelated they showed the poorest
discrimination and judgments were compressed in toward the zero rating on
the scale.
These findings reject the possibility that all meaningful data are created
equal and it is just the contrast between meaningful versus abstract data that
affects discrimination; different types of prior belief about meaningful data
did have differential effects. Further, these findings reject the hypothesis that
having any hypothesis, whatever it may be, helps assess contingency in new
data. The Don’t Know condition, where subjects lacked such a hypothesis, fared
best considering both sensitivity and bias, and the Belief in Zero condition,
where prior beliefs are probably most firmly held, showed the worst overall
discrimination. Finally, the findings are consistent with the idea that working
under the belief that variables might but need not be related provides all the
benefits but none of the costs of assessing meaningful data.
Clues about Processing: Bias, Discrimination, and Sensitivity
As in prior research, subjects were biased by their prior beliefs. In addition,
we showed that discrimination, not just bias was affected; the Belief in Zero
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condition showed very poor discrimination. We would like to be able to
determine whether this poor discrimination is due to poor underlying sensitivity
or simply the product of a strong bias which com presses all judgments toward
the zero point. While it would be possible to have good discrimination over
a very narrow interval of the scale, this would require a corresponding very
strong reduction in variability. The forced choice judgments were designed to
distinguish sensitivity from bias. Overall performance on this task was rather
poor, but here there was no disadvantage (and in fact better performance) for
the Belief in Zero condition. Thus our findings are consistent with the view that
differences in discrimination across belief conditions stem from differences in
bias. This suggests that the prior beliefs have most of their effect relatively late
in the assessment process at the point when a rating is assigned to a perceived
degree of relatedness. We have no evidence that there are effects on initial
encoding or evaluating evidence in our tasks.
From a performance perspective, it does not matter whether poor sensitivity
contributes to the poor discrimination; a prior belief in unrelatedness produces
a bias so strong that it would ordinarily preclude the expression of underlying
sensitivity. From a theoretical perspective, it would be valuable to distinguish
between these more sharply.

learning tasks. Hence, our findings are only suggestive of what the effects of
prior belief may be when judgments are based on sequential or nonnumerical
observations. Nevertheless, we believe that our findings may reflect some very
basic properties of learning about how attributes are related and the use of
such knowledge once learned. Specifically, establishing which variables are
mutually relevant or belong to the same domain may be a very fundamental
part of correlational learning. Some of this partitioning may be innately given;
much of it is surely learned. Researchers such as Klayman (1984, 1988) have
argued that discovering which features are predictive is the most important
component of complex learning. His work shows that discovering what is
mutually relevant and predictive goes a long way toward predictive success.
Our work shows that success assessing correlations depends, in turn, on prior
beliefs about mutual relevance. Indeed, it is striking how deeply the effects of
prior belief pervaded our task: presumably there was no ambiguity about what
information was relevant, no problem in selecting what information to attend
to, and no domain-specific assessment procedures where prior beliefs might
have exerted their influence. Nevertheless, prior beliefs about relevance had
profound and distinctive effects on performance.

CONCLUSION
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